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The Histories
Welcome to the Fall 2006 issue o f The Histories, La Salle University’s studentproduced academic journal. Going into our sixth year o f continuous publication at La
Salle, we hope this edition meets the high standards of quality history research set by its
predecessors.
In this issue we are happy to continue to bring you some o f the best work of La
Salle students, both undergraduate and graduate. We have four articles that encompass a
wide range o f historical topics: airborne troops in WWII, the charisma o f Churchill, a
poignant piece on historical preservation and a historical comparison o f the Vietnam War
and the current war in Iraq. Rounded off with two well-written book reviews, this issue
should please anyone interested in history. Come to think of it, those reviewed books
might serve as great stocking-stuffers...
As always I extend my heartfelt thanks to Tim Smalarz, my Graphic Designer and
Supervising Editor. Not only does he make this issue possible—Tim goes out o f his way
to keep me in line and make me meet my own deadlines. Thanks are also due to Mike
Nicholas, my returning Assistant Editor, for all his hard work and help with the most
minute (and often boring) details. The Historical Society would be nowhere without the
help of moderator Professor Jeffery LaMonica and department chair Dr. Charles
Desnoyers. The History Department would of course be nowhere without its fine faculty.
Thank you all. The Society also very much appreciates the financial assistance of Chris
Kazmierczak for making the publication o f this journal possible, and is grateful for the
academic endeavors o f those writers who submitted to this issue o f The Histories.
So, dear reader, I hope you enjoy perusing this issue as much as we enjoyed
putting it together. I’m sure you will find that it can hold its own amongst the other fine
academic works that have preceded it. See you in 2007.
Courtney E. Bowers

Fall 2006

Writers: Dennis Carey, Jamie Konieczny, William Lodge, Michael Nicholas, Sarah
Bischoff, and Christopher Schwartz
Moderators: Dr. Charles Desnoyers, Dr. Stuart Leibiger, and Professor Jeffrey
LaMonica
Editors: Courtney Bowers, Editor-In-Chief, Timothy Smalarz, Supervising/Copy Editor,
and Michael Nicholas, Associate Editor.
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I
The U nited States Airborne D ivisions, and Their Role on June 6,1944

By Dennis Carey ‘07

The United States Airborne Divisions that were dropped behind Utah Beach in the
early morning hours o f June 6,1944 played a critical role in the eventual success of
Operation Overlord. On the evening of June 5th, General Eisenhower visited the men o f
the 101st Airborne division as they geared up in preparation for their jump. In making his
rounds among the troops giving his words of encouragement, a paratrooper remarked
“Hell, we ain’t worried General. It’s the Krauts that ought to be worrying now.”1 This is
just one example o f the confidence and fortitude that the men of both the 82nd and 101st
Airborne divisions possessed on the eve of Operation Overlord. Characteristics such as
these would prove to be invaluable as they flew over Hitler’s Atlantic Wall and
parachuted into Nazi occupied France. Despite their optimism, most of the men o f the
Airborne would soon be faced with countless setbacks— setbacks that began before they
even jumped out o f their transport planes.
Things began to go wrong as soon as they began to approach the French coastline.
On their approach to the designated drop zones the transport planes carrying the
paratroopers planned to fly in a tight formation, dropping the men in a set pattern that
would allow for quick assembly into an effective fighting force. Guiding the planes to
their assigned drop zones would be seven teams of pathfinders. These pathfinders were
specially trained and sent in ahead of the main force; at about midnight on June 6th they
would become the first allied soldiers to hit the ground in Nazi controlled France. They
carried with them beacons that were intended to guide the inbound transports to their
targets. Upon landing, the pathfinders found that they had not been dropped where they
intended, as Clay Blair notes in his book Ridgway’s Paratroopers. “Only two of the
seven teams came down in precisely the right place. Owing to navigational and other
errors, some pathfinders were dropped as far as two miles off target, errors that would

1 Ambrose, Stephen A. 1994. D-Day June 6 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War it. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 193.
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have grave consequences.”2 The first wave o f aircraft carrying both the 82nd and 101st
followed the route of the pathfinders towards their drop zones at about 1:00 AM on June
6th, expecting to be led by the pathfinders beacons. Most o f the planes found no beacons
at all. They were not aware that the many o f the pathfinder’s objectives were not yet
accomplished—mainly because they were ordered to be under strict radio silence.
The men flying the transports were the pilots o f the Army Air Force’s Troop
Carrier Command. For many it was their first combat mission. They had not been trained
to deal with night operations, anti-aircraft fire, or foul weather.3 As they came over
France, all hell broke loose. They encountered cloudbanks which decreased their
visibility to nearly nothing, along with heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Germans on the
ground. Many o f the ill-prepared pilots broke their tight V formations and took evasive
action, essentially throwing the airborne divisions into chaos before they could even hit
the ground. Instead o f being dropped in their planned drop zones, there were two entire
divisions of paratroopers scattered over several miles throughout the Normandy
countryside.
The two airborne divisions being dropped each had their own objectives upon
landing. The 82nd Airborne Division was to be dropped into three zones around the town
o f Ste. Mere Eglise and the adjacent Merderet River. Their two main objectives were to
secure the town, which lay to the north of their proposed drop zones, and to move to
destroy bridges over the Douve River to protect the flank o f the invasion force. Their
commanding officer was General Matthew Ridgway; Operation Overlord was only his
fifth parachute jump; it would certainly be a trial by fire. The 101st Airborne Division was
also supposed to be dropped into three zones, further east and closer to Utah Beach than
the 82nd. They were to secure the causeways that crossed the marsh behind Utah Beach
and also move to the south toward Carentan to seize key bridges. They were under the
command o f General Max Taylor.
Both of the airborne divisions would only be mildly successful in achieving their
planned objectives on D-Day, and they each would face many of the same problems. One
problem many paratroopers encountered was the loss of their equipment during the jump:
many of the pilots had not slowed-down enough, causing more intense shock upon the
opening o f the parachutes which in turn caused essential gear to be ripped off. Another
unanticipated problem was a large flooded area around the Merderet River into which
elements of the 82nd were dropped. The Germans intentionally flooded the area, however
reconnaissance had mistaken it for solid ground. Thirty-six paratroopers o f the 82nd
would drown in the marsh, while others were forced to abandon their gear to escape.4 A
typical paratrooper was wearing between 125 and 150 pounds of gear strapped to his
body, which made it much harder to move upon landing.5 Some troopers found
themselves alone when they reached the ground; many were dropped from altitudes that
caused them to land extremely spread out. Troops in both divisions would encounter this
problem, and in some cases elements of the 82nd and the 101st became mixed due to miss

2 Blair, Clay. 1985. Ridgway's Paratroopers, the American Airborne in World War II. Garden City, New
York: The Dial Press, 217.
3 Ambrose, 198.
4 Ambrose, 214.
5 Blair, 219.

The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1

4

drops. Soldiers were forced to band together and work individually or in small units
towards their rally points.
Following the first waves o f parachutists, at roughly 3:00 AM more C-47s began
to arrive towing behind them glider-borne troops of both the 82nd and 101st. Sixty-nine of
these gliders landed in the area o f Ranville, reinforcing the 101st, forty-nine landed safely
in a zone cleared by the paratroopers earlier. Simultaneously fifty-two gliders landed six
kilometers from Ste. Mere Eglise, intended to reinforce the 82nd. These gliders had many
problems when attempting to land—the clearings in which they were to land were much
too small. They also encountered massive hedgerows, which many o f the gliders slid into
upon landing causing great damage. The glider force would go on to have twenty-five
men killed, one hundred eighteen wounded, and fourteen missing out of nine hundred
fifty-seven total men. The glider troops o f the 82nd took sixteen percent casualties before
it even was in action.6 Many o f these came due to the poor reconnaissance that did not
consider the size o f the Norman hedgerows and the German defenses in the area.
O f the two divisions, the 101st was in much better shape than the 82nd in the early
morning hours of June 6th. The 101st was able to quickly move towards their objective
behind Utah Beach. Twenty-four hours after the drop, the 101st had assembled only about
2,500 of the 6,000 men who had jumped. They had taken Ste. Martin de Varreville along
with Pouppeville, which were both key to the breakout of troops landing on the beach.
Elements o f the 101st were also moving towards Carentan, which General Omar Bradley
hoped could be taken by D+l [the day after D-Day],
Although their force was more scattered, elements of the 82nd were also able to
make headway. O f all of the troops jumping on D-Day, the 505th Parachute Infantry of
the 82nd had one of the best jumps. In the book O u t o f the Blue, James Huston explains
why this occurred: “Its troop carrier planes too had been scattered, but many o f them
were able to circle back and find the drop zone which the pathfinders had clearly
marked.”7 The dangerous decision to circle back allowed for about 180 men, under the
command of Lt. Col. Ed Krause, to assemble.
By 4:00 AM Krause was moving toward Ste. Mere Eglise. He was guided by a
French man into town, who pointed out the locations of the defending Germans. Some
thirty Germans surrendered to Krause and his men, while ten were killed resisting.8 At
4:30 AM, Krause hoisted the American flag on a church steeple in Ste. Mere Eglise.
Americans had liberated their first town in France since 1918.9 Despite being the only
airborne unit to achieve one of its objectives, the 82nd was still much slower to assemble.
Two days after jumping, they had only 2,100 men under unified command.10 Without the
success of the pathfinders that marked the landing area o f the 505th or the fortitude of the
pilots who chose to circle back instead o f simply dropping the men, the 82nd Airborne
division probably would not have accomplished any o f its objectives on D-Day. This is a
prime example of what the paratroopers could have accomplished had their drops gone as
planned.

6 Ambrose, 219-221.
7 Huston, James A. 1972. Out of the Blue, USArmy Airborne Operations in World War II. West Lafayette,
Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 183.
8 Ambrose, 237.
9 Gilbert, Martin. 2004. D-Day. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 141.
10 Huston, 183.
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As groups o f soldiers came together all across the Norman countryside, they were
forced to make due with what they had and do whatever it took to link up into larger
groups. There was little to no chain of command; it was the responsibility o f the Junior
Officers and enlisted men to act independently to link up into larger forces. For many of
these soldiers, Overlord was their first combat jump; American soldiers were not
professionals, but rather citizen soldiers that may have been young teenagers when Hitler
took over France. They were faced with a situation for which they had not trained, and
were forced to improvise in many situations. In their briefings prior to their jumps they
were instructed to do whatever they could to disrupt the Germans, and they did just that.
“The overall missions o f the three airborne divisions were to disrupt and confuse
the Germans so as to prevent a concentrated counterattack against the seaborne troops
coming in at dawn, and to protect the flanks,”11 is Stephen Ambrose’ description o f the
universal objective of the airborne troops from his book D-Day. The men o f the airborne
did exactly that on June 6,1944. They had clear objectives, but it became very clear to
nearly all o f the men that their objectives were largely unattainable due to the scattered
nature in which they were dropped.
Many units began to render the German lines of communication useless in their
efforts to cause havoc behind the German lines. The Germans had been firmly in place in
France for almost five years, and in that time they had grown reliant on more secure land
communication lines rather than radio. When the men o f the airborne began to cut as
many telephone lines as they possibly could, it isolated some German units and left them
out o f contact with their commands. These isolated units were unsure of what was
happening, and were caught off-guard by the paratroopers. Without contact to their high
command, they were forced to wait for other avenues of communication to be established
before taking drastic action. This confusion bought the paratroopers much needed time to
organize.
Since the paratroopers were so scattered, it was hard for the defending Germans to
discern how many o f them actually landed. Sightings of US soldiers all across Normandy
in varying strengths confused the Germans. In addition to not being sure o f where the
main drop was, the Germans were thrown off by a diversion called Operation Titanic.
Titanic consisted o f about 12 commandos, along with about 1,000 dummy parachutists
that were dropped southeast o f Omaha Beach. The commandos were armed with
recordings of chatter and small arms fire that they played over loudspeakers. The German
unit in that section, the 915th Infantry, moved not toward the invasion beaches but the
“allied force” near Isigny. Only two o f the twelve commandos would survive the action.12
By the time the 915th Infantry realized where the real landings were, the Allies
had already established a strong beachhead and were moving inland. Operation Titanic
was just one o f the many deceptions that were put forward to confuse the German
defenders and make the job of the American paratroopers easier. The German high
command knew an invasion was coming, and many of them mistakenly felt that the
invasion at Normandy was not the invasion.13 This blunder would allow the Allies to
breach the Atlantic Wall and establish a firm beachhead on the Normandy coast. From

11 Ambrose, 227.
12 Gilbert, 130-131
13 Ambrose, 303.
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that beachhead would flow an amazing volume o f allied men and firepower that would
open Hitler’s dreaded second front, and eventually penetrate deep into Nazi territory.
The United States Airborne forces that landed in Normandy on June 6,1944 truly
played an integral role in Operation Overlord. It is realized that there were many
shortcomings in the parachute drops of the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions; both units
still contributed to Allied victory at Normandy. The 82nd, despite being scattered,
managed to take Ste. Mere Eglise and hold it until they were supported by seaborne
tanks. The 101st was successful in opening up the causeways behind Utah Beach and
taking out key German artillery batteries.
Although neither division of the U.S. Airborne was successful in all of their initial
objectives, they accomplished their overall mission to disrupt the Germans and cause
confusion behind their lines. The Airborne troop divisions were elite units that were
highly trained and superbly equipped, and they proved their value on D-Day and in the
campaign following it. By June 11, D + 5 ,17,400 paratroopers and glidertroops had
landed in Normandy. The airborne divisions continued to fight as ground units in
Normandy following D-Day for thirty-three more days, until being relieved on July 8th.14
Both divisions of United State parachutists would serve bravely in the campaign for
Normandy. The men o f the airborne, from Privates to Generals, would continue to
impress the Allied high command with their improvisational skills in Operation Overlord
and many subsequent campaigns in the liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe.

14 Huston, 186.
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Churchill: The G lim m er of H ope in Britain's Dark Days

By Jaime Konieczny ‘07

When World War II broke out in 1939,Winston Churchill was not the British
Prime Minister. However, he had been a Member of Parliament for forty years and as the
war steadily increased in intensity his tenacious leadership inspired the country to elect
him as Prime Minister by May o f 1940. It has been said that he was one of the greatest
leaders in the 20th century because of his inspiration, aggressive leadership and refusal to
surrender. Along with his dynamic spirit, Churchill’s creation and appointment of the
position Minister of Defense in 1940 was crucial for Britain’s perseverance during the
darkest time of World War II (June 1940-41). Through the establishment of this position
and his own personal knowledge Churchill was able to effectively direct and control the
war effort and create an atmosphere of hope in an uncertain time for the British people,
which ultimately lead to their victory in the war.
Churchill created the position o f Minister of Defense primarily because of his
previous concerns about the lack of effective administrative organization and control of
wartime activities. He feared the lack o f centralized information and decision-making.
This fear had developed over his time in political office because he had taken part in and
witnessed many issues develop from this lack of centralization. He began his role in
politics before the First World War, attempting amelioration between the British and
German naval rivalry in 1913.1 In 1914 he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty
with duties that included the air defense of London and the protection o f the Royal Navy
and merchant shipping from German naval attack. In 1917 he was put in charge of the
munitions production in Britain, which during this time was of great importance because
supplies were low and strained. As his popularity began to grow he was designated as the
diplomatic leader to devise a planned system of demobilization in order to calm and
appease the tensions o f the unsatisfied soldiers returning from the war.2

1 Martin Gilbert. Winston Churhill's War Leadership (New York:Vintage Books 2003) 4
2 IBID
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These experiences helped Churchill develop a better understanding of politics and
the inter-working o f military defense strategy, all o f which he later drew upon when he
was reappointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939 and further still when elected Prime
Minister in 1940. Many o f his experiences helped him develop and establish one o f his
core ideas: that military intelligence needed a centralized person to which to report in
order to better facilitate the actions necessary to quickly and efficiently protect British
interests.
During the outbreak o f World War II, Winston Churchill was not the most
popular man in the British political world. In fact he was alienated and ostracized by both
his party and the labor movement after speaking out against the Munich Conference in
September 1938 that gave the Sudetenland to Germany. He prophesized more doom and
dismay to come.3 Yet despite this gloomy outlook on the present events, some of the
most important assets Churchill possessed during the winter of 1938-39 were his unique
isolationist stance and his obstinate opposition to appeasement4 It was because of this
isolation that as the war progressed he was capable of speaking out and gaining public
support. By May of 1939 a Gallop poll questioned the public asking “Are you in favour
of Mr. Winston Churchill being invited to join the Cabinet?” 56% of those polled
answered yes.5 He regained popularity slowly, beginning with the help of the “anti
appeasement section o f the press” and continuing this growth through his actions and
through a round of speeches delivered when he was appointed First Lord o f Admiralty.
His actions were drastically different from those of Prime Minister Chamberlain, who
often seemed ill at ease as a war minister. Churchill raised the morale of the people
simply by possessing a beaming face and exuberant style while holding office.6
Churchill’s full recovery from political isolation and public support occurred after
two speeches, the first o f which was on Sept. 26,1939. While delivering a review o f the
war at sea, one member o f the House of Commons noted, “One could feel the spirits of
the House rising with every word.” The second speech occurred as a broadcast on Oct 1,
1939 on the state o f the war and the British war effort during which it was described as
“even more prime ministerial performance.”7 These were key moments that instilled
hope, revived spirits and allowed trust from the British people and from Parliament. The
hope Churchill gave the people was not from the words he spoke but in the manner,
intonation and grace with which he said them, for “The effect o f Winston’s speech was
infinitely greater than could be derived from any reading of the text.”8 The effect o f his
speeches was to add to his continuous growth in popularity as well as to lead to a deeper
respect and admiration by the British people.
Due to the increase in support for Churchill and the failing self-confidence of
Chamberlain with the debacle at Norway, Churchill was elected the successor to
Chamberlain as the British Prime Minister in May of 1940. Following his election to the
premiership, Churchill set about evaluating all aspects of British foreign policy. He
determined that Britain would not only remain in the war but would continue to take the

3 Paul Addison Churchill: The Unexpected Hero (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 150-151
4 IB ID ,152
s IB ID ,154
6 IBID, 156-157.
7 IBID
8 IBID

The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1

10

offensive against Hitler wherever possible. It was Churchill’s own strength o f conviction
and determination to be victorious in the war that squelched any thought o f peace through
appeasement. Britain was now committed not only to fighting, but to winning World
War II.9 He “had come to power to prosecute the war more forcefully,”10 and began
doing so by creating new positions within the Executive Departments. His first action as
Prime Minister created the position and title o f Minister o f Defense, which he then
appointed himself. By creating this position he effectively took the central control of the
war away from the War Cabinet who had conducted the war efforts under Chamberlain.
The reason behind this new position was that the war should be centralized, in fact “he
followed the war on all fronts in great detail with the aid of a portable Map Room.” One
o f the main facets of this position was that Churchill now had the right both to summon
the Chiefs of Staff and to give them instructions on the conduct o f war.11
Through this position the military secretariat o f the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of
Staff Committee were incorporated into a small department under his direct control. The
War Cabinet met almost daily and made all the fundamental decisions of the war with
regard to Churchill’s opinion and wishes. His aide General Ismay and his two deputies,
who had control of the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee,
headed the Defense Office. It reported directly to him, something that had never been
done before.12 Both committees were in charge of establishing the feasibility o f the plans
submitted to them by both Churchill himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13 By creating
this office and applying his own experiences and understanding o f how the war should be
fought Churchill effectively changed the course of the British defense system. He had
eliminated any internal fighting or conflicts by systematically taking full control so that
by the middle of the war he no longer called meetings with the Defense Committee of the
War Cabinet but instead ran the military aspect o f the war through his personal thoughts
and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As a wartime leader he was greatly respected but
often ran his staff very hard.14
Churchill demanded as much from himself as he did from the staff with which he
worked. He gave everything he had, and told the English people he had to offer “nothing
but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” He sacrificed in order to keep the British morale alive
and to fulfill his promise that “[w]e shall defend our island, whatever the cost may
be.. .we shall never surrender.” In his attempts to keep the war effort contained and
controlled directly he demanded up-to-the-minute updates from all fronts o f the war.
During the height of the Battle o f Britain he lived in a bunker beneath the Cabinet office
where he could be reached at all times and could also make radio broadcasts to the British
citizens.15 He did not keep regular work hours because his work was everywhere. From
his home and office every one of his advisors, secretaries and Generals could be sent for
5 John Charmley, Churchill The End of Glory A Political Biography.(New York: Harcourt Brace &
Company, 1993), 400.
10 IBID, 398
11 Addison 174
12
Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1953) 317
13 Addison, 174
14 IBID, 175
ls William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (Boston: Little
Brown and Company) 6-8
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at any time of the day or night in order to be dictated notes and orders. This was vastly
different from Chamberlain who had conducted everything through the process of formal
meetings and arranged times.16
For Churchill the work did not end and he constantly needed to be in the know
and in the thick o f whatever was going on. This often caused him to run out in between
bombings during the Battle of Britain so that he could view the damage from a firsthand
account. He would later assess it as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.17 After
Churchill was given information he was often able to see the larger picture and theorize
Hitler’s next move from a political and ideological aspect. This unique ability was
derived from his many years of experience and his understanding o f the German
maneuvers during WWI. Due to this he often suggested plans that the British Intelligence
community did not understand because they viewed Hitler’s strategy only from their own
military viewpoints while failing to learn the lessons o f history. Churchill’s main
conclusion, reached in a “lightening flash” of illumination, was that Hitler would
probably attack the Soviet Union after defeating Great Britain or possibly even before. In
May o f 1941 he sent a letter of warning to Stalin but Stalin did not heed the warning. His
foresight and intuitive analysis of Hitler’s intention to move East helped him have a
better understanding of the influx o f the information filtering through London.18
Another essential aspect of Churchill as Prime Minister and Minster of Defense
was that he recognized the desperate need for aide to Great Britain. Churchill was
determined to stand his ground and never surrender, but he was also not above asking for
help. He directed his pleas to President Roosevelt and the United States. Churchill was
convinced even before his appointment as Prime Minister that if Great Britain did not
gain support from another country, the results could be devastating. Therefore Churchill’s
other great act in the spring and summer of 1940 was to convince President Roosevelt
that Great Britain was still willing and able to fight and therefore was worthy of their
support.19 Knowing that U.S. support was essential to the survival Britain, both U.S. and
British media sources began proliferating propaganda throughout the U.S. proclaiming
Churchill as a national hero as soon as he was elected Prime Minister. This was designed
to spark public support in favor o f accepting a deal such as the Lend Lease Act,
legislation that was proposed by Churchill in a letter to President Roosevelt. Churchill’s
ability to produce a spirited and rising oration made his U.S. observers enthralled with his
“extrovert style of leadership” and was a great asset in garnering Congressional support.20
The Lend Lease Act was enacted by Congress in 1941.
After gathering support from the U.S., Churchill was equipped to devote the
necessary time to promote and plan projects for British offensive landings on the beaches
o f Norway, Sicily, Italy and North Africa. Churchill’s military approach was an almost
entirely offensive strategy to thwart the enemy at any feasible location. He was not a
calculated strategist; he often was caught closely examining one area and then soon
fixating on another target. However, by being able to understand the method o f Hitler’s
strategy and using his previous experience Churchill was capable o f turning the tide of

16 Addison, 183
11 Manchester, 7-8
18 Tuvia Ben-Moshi Churchill: Strategy and History (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992) 141-142
19 Addison, 178
“ IBID, 179-180
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the war by means of “constant action as wide scale as possible so that the enemy would
be made to continually ‘bleed and bum,’ a phrase he often used.”21
Churchill’s other great feat was putting aside political and personal dislikes in
order to ally with the Soviet Union to form a tight, cohesive alliance with the goal of
attacking Germany from all sides. He saw this as almost an act of treachery and would
not have agreed except as acting Minister o f Defense the mere size o f the Soviet Union
offered an unquestionable strategic advantage o f sheer manpower against the Germans. It
also showed the ability to support the Eastern Front, possibly allowing for the
establishment o f democratic ideas at the war’s end. Thus, through the arguments and
coercion o f President Roosevelt, Churchill agreed to ally Great Britain with the Soviet
Union and participate in active talks with Stalin. This was essential to the war because it
showed that Churchill, although gruff and stubborn, would and could do what he deemed
necessary for the British success in the war effort.22
Winston Churchill as a Prime Minister effectively inspired and guided the British
through the grimmest part o f the war while still giving them hope. As Minister of
Defense he created a brand-new system in which the war would operate effectively under
his direct control. He was making strategic military alliances in which he procured the
necessary supplies and support to manage British survival. “As a war leader, he was head
and shoulders above anyone the British or any other nation could produce. He was
indispensable and completely irreplaceable.”23 Therefore it was Churchill and his
political, ideological and military leadership combined with his previous experiences that
sternly and miraculously led a fighting, hopeful Great Britain through June o f 1940-1941;
and ultimately to victory.

21 Addison, 182
22 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 139
23 Addison, 182
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III
Historical Preservation
By William Lodge (Graduate Student)

When any building is tom down, something is lost. Sometimes the loss is the
house where a family grew up, sometimes it is where your grandpa went to school, or
your mom and dad married, and sometimes it is where a familiar product was invented.
The history of a building tells the story of who built it and those who occupied it, stories
that are lost when that building is no more.
The desire to get rid of old buildings for new ones encourages a “culture of
destruction” that makes it easier to tear down even more buildings. Such a culture is not
a healthy culture. While it is not possible to save every building, a balance must be
reached. Just as an ecosystem works the best when there is a balance of species, the built
environment of a city works the best when there are enough older buildings to give the
residents a link to their past, as well as newer buildings that provide for the needs of the
people who live here. New buildings cannot meet every need.
Every structure built by humans has an expected life span, and choices made
during construction have an effect on how long that life span is. The Pyramids in Egypt
have survived for thousands of years, but they are an exception. Other ancient structures
survive, but they are few in number, and many, like the Parthenon in Athens and the
Coliseum in Rome, are no longer useable. Except for those lost by fire or natural forces,
the end of a building’s life occurs because of a choice made by its owners. Some
structures are demolished, while others are neglected until they collapse. Often this
decision is based on economic grounds. Some buildings are unique enough to be saved
from demolition. Others are saved because o f the history connected to them. Others, with
neither history nor uniqueness attached, are demolished in order that newer buildings
might take their places.
In the past, demolishing old buildings equaled progress to Americans; old was not
valuable, it was just old. If it is measured in that way, progress means a loss of continuity.
Further, progress means the loss o f some of the nation’s greatest public structures. At one
time, New York City possessed one of the country’s great landmarks, Pennsylvania 1

1 Anthony M. Tung, Preserving the World's Great Cities (Potter: 2001) 1
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Station. Here the Pennsylvania Railroad delivered passengers into the heart o f Manhattan.
Unfortunately, the early 1960s saw the last of Pennsylvania Station. The people o f New
York did not want to lose this public place, but in the end there was no way to save the
station. It was not until 1965 that laws were enacted that could be used to preserve
landmarks.2
The decisions that led to the loss o f Pennsylvania Station were taken by the
Pennsylvania Railroad with no thought to how New York residents would be affected.
Pennsylvania Station’s fate was decided as early as 1955, when air rights above the
Station were sold by the Pennsylvania Railroad, meaning that the property was open for
development. After the development rights were sold, it was inevitable that economic
pressures would lead to the destruction of the station. Pennsylvania Station could have
lasted a long time, but it was destroyed after 53 years.3 There is a new Pennsylvania
Station, but it is below ground. Essentially, the new station is a basement. The
Pennsylvania Station of 1910 to 1964 was a temple.
Pictures can give an idea of what it was like to enter the city of New York by way
o f this Pennsylvania Station. This was a building modeled after the Roman Tepidarium,
or bathhouse, at Caracalla, except that the station was 20 percent bigger. The roof o f the
main waiting room was far overhead. Large iron beams made into arches held it up. The
roof was made out of hundreds of glass panes. The effect was very much like that o f a
cathedral, with the arches forming a cross up above, and glass letting the light shine
through. The main waiting room was 278 feet long, 102 feet wide and 147 feet high.4
“Through it one entered the city like a God,” architectural critic Vincent Scully wrote.
“One scuttles in now like a rat.”5
This modem Roman Temple was built by the Pennsylvania Railroad to provide
direct access to downtown New York for its passenger trains. Pennsylvania Station was a
place where the coffee shop counters were made out of marble.6 Twenty granite eagles
decorated the outside, above columns higher than some buildings. Many citizens o f New
York did not want to give up the station, but there was no legal way for citizens to fight
the demolition of such a public landmark. In 1962, the idea for a New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission was new.7 In the 1960s the tearing down of an old
building was progress. Old was worthless. “If you want to preserve Pennsylvania Station,
you have to buy it,” New York architect Norman Jaffe was told by fellow architect
Phillip Johnson.8 There was public support to save the station, but not enough. In the
end, it was demolished.
Pennsylvania Station was lost, but not lost in vain. In the same way that Rachel
Carson’s publication o f Silent Spring helped create the modem environmental
movement, the fight over Pennsylvania Station helped create the modem preservation
movement. A few short years later, Grand Central Station, just a few miles south, was

2 Tung, 36!
3 Kevin Walsh, Forgotten New York accessed at:
http://www.forgotten-ny.com/STREET%20SCENES/Penn%20Station/penn.htm]
4 Peter Moore, The Destruction of Penn Station (Distributed Art Publishers: 2000) 17
5 William Middleton, “Penn Station Lives!” American Heritage of Invention and Technology (Volume 13
Issue 3, 1998) 55
6 Moore, 15
7 Ibid, 25.
1 Lorraine Diehl, The Late, Great Pennsylvania Station (Houghton Mifflin: 1985) 19
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threatened. This time, the preservationists were ready. Allies such as Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis helped publicize their cause.9 Grand Central Station survived, and it is unlikely
to be threatened by demolition anytime soon. Similar, smaller battles are fought all the
time throughout the United States. When they are won a part o f local history is saved.
When they are lost, so is a part o f local history.
In 1984, Leon Krier wrote, “Sixty percent o f German buildings survived the
Second World War. Only less that fifteen percent o f these survived the industrial plans of
the last thirty years”.10 The big idea of urban planners was to replace old buildings with
new ones. As Jackie Onassis said, “A young country, constantly re-forming its image of
itself, the United States tore down too much. We saw great buildings and cherished small
neighborhoods disappear. The voice of preservationists was a lonely voice, powerless
against the mighty commercial interests.” 11 However, the preservation of historic
buildings was not new in the 1960s. In fact, the beginnings of the preservation movement
date back more than a century.
If there was a birthplace for historical preservation in the United States, it was at
Mount Vernon. George Washington’s estate was in his family until 1850. At that time it
was offered to either the United States government or the State of Virginia for $200,000.
In 1858 Mount Vernon was purchased by the Mount Vernon Ladies Association. They
were a private group, and they still run George Washington’s home today. George
Washington was such a revered figure that it seemed fitting that his home be preserved.
The way it was saved set a precedent regarding the preservation o f noteworthy structures.
In general, governments were not going to be involved in efforts to save history. It was
going to be up to private groups to save historic buildings.12
In the same area of Virginia as Mount Vernon is Monticello, the home of Thomas
Jefferson, third President of the United States. Like Mount Vernon, Monticello has also
been lovingly preserved. However, the Monticello a visitor sees today never existed in
Jefferson’s lifetime.13 It wasn’t finished in its current form until after his death.
According to Stewart Brand, Jefferson, perhaps because he was a widower, was able to
continually rebuild the house. “There was no wife to say ‘you pull down one more wall
and I’m out of here.’”14 A part o f Jefferson’s estate that was not often mentioned by tour
guides are the slave quarters. Unlike the rest of Monticello, they were not preserved.
Attempts are being made to reproduce some kind of representation o f them, but it is
difficult to re-create a landscape when so much has changed. Monticello and Mount
Vernon were slave owning estates, but the groups that run them had decided not to focus
attention on this fact. Jefferson (and Washington) as a slave owner does not fit into
American mythology. However, it is likely that the slave quarters were not preserved not
out of a desire to hide the presence o f slaves but because there was no interest in doing
so. At one time there were many examples o f places that housed slaves. Why preserve
something so common? Add to that the lack of interest in telling the stories of African

5 George H. Douglas, “What Was Grand About Grand Central” Locomotive and Railway Preservation
(Issue 43 September/October 1993) 25
10 Stewart Brand, How Buildings Learn (Penguin Books: 1995) 82
11 Douglas, 25
12 Brand, 95
13 Brand, 44
14 Brand, 43
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Americans in the century following the American Civil war, and the lack o f preserved
slave houses is hardly surprising.
Not every building’s road to preservation is easily mapped. For example, the
house on Arch Street in Philadelphia known as the Betsy Ross House may not have been
lived in by Ms. Ross at all. There is evidence that the story of her sewing the flag was
created for the American Centennial in 1876.15 It may not be the house Betsy Ross lived
in, but it is an example o f a small colonial house such as a seamstress might have lived in.
Without the mythology there is a good chance the house would have been tom down. The
Betsy Ross House has been preserved, but like Jefferson with Monticello, Ross never saw
a home like this. Today the house is exposed on all sides. In the past it was more or less
a row home. This does not negate the preservation of the house, even if the story o f Betsy
Ross is a myth. However, like Monticello, it is impossible to entirely re-create the past.
The preservation o f famous homes saves knowledge o f how people lived in the
past. Many former homes of presidents have been saved. The evolution of Monticello can
teach much about who Thomas Jefferson was. Mount Vernon tells a similar story about
George Washington. Both Presidential homes were added onto by their owners, and the
revelations about their characters are fascinating. Washington added a two story porch to
the side of the house that faces the Potomac River. It has been called the nicest place in
America to sit.16 Washington made Mount Vernon “the best added-on-to American
house o f the 18lh century” according to building historian William Seale. Washington the
builder adds to the image of General Washington and President Washington. Without the
evidence provided by his preserved home, Washington the builder would not be as
accessible as he is to Americans today.
Sometimes there is an effort to recreate the setting of a historical building.
Sometimes there is no effort to recreate the past. Instead, the goal seems more to be to
add a touch of the past to a modem street setting. Sometimes, only a part o f the older
building is saved. Facadism is a term that means the only original part of a building is the
exterior that faces the street. For example, Lit Brothers department store in Philadelphia
was renovated in 1989. The inside was changed, but the Victorian era facade was
preserved intact.17 Is this preservation? Many would argue it is not, but in this case the
alternative was demolition. If all that can be saved are the outside walls it may be worth
it. An extreme example o f facadism is in Lake Havasu City, Arizona. In 1969 developer
Robert P. McCullough bought London Bridge for 2.46 million dollars. He then shipped
the bridge from London to Arizona. However, McCullough did not ship the whole bridge.
He shipped the stone facing, the handrails, and all the other visible parts, later reattaching
them to a poured concrete shape.18 It looks like the old London Bridge, but is this really
London Bridge? Is this the London Bridge that Dickens wrote about? If it were not saved
in this form the bridge would have been destroyed. But is it still the place where Dickens
walked? This question might be better answered by a philosopher rather than a historian
or an architect, but it is the kind of issue that preservationists struggle with constantly.
Sometimes only pieces o f a building can be saved. There were twenty-two stone
eagles that sat high above the entrances to Pennsylvania Station. Many were saved and

15 James Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me (Simon and Shuster: 1995) 31
16 Brand, 39
17 Francis Morrone, An Architectural Guidebook to Philadelphia (Gibbs Smith: 1999) 120
18 Reed Karaim, “A Bridge Too Far” Preservation (July/August 2001) 64
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relocated. Four were removed as far away as Philadelphia. They now guard the comers
of the Market Street Bridge across the Schuylkill River, near 30th street Station.19 Others
remain in New York. Other pieces of Pennsylvania Station survive, if you know where
to look.20 Pennsylvania Station is not the only historic New York building to have a piece
preserved in Philadelphia. A statue that the sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens created to
stand atop the original Madison Square Garden is preserved in the Philadelphia Museum
ofA rt.21
Reusing buildings is not new. In fact, many buildings are being used for things
other than what they were originally designed for. The Academy o f Music in Philadelphia
has been the home o f the Orchestra for many years. However, it was not built for the
orchestra.22 It was built as an opera house. The Atwater Kent museum is located in the
former home of the Franklin Institute.23
Sometimes the new use is close to the old one; sometimes it is not close at all.
Still, old buildings can be adapted to serve new and exciting purposes. For example,
factories are large, strong buildings with a great deal of open space inside. They have a
lot o f ventilation and light, as well as extra strength utilities inside them. They also have
character and a story to tell. Re-using a factory gives the new occupant a nicer place to
work than a suburban industrial park does, or a more interesting place to live.24A visit to
Philadelphia reveals that this option is becoming popular, with many old factories now in
use as condominiums.
The Lowell Mills of Massachusetts are famous in American history. The textile
mills are where, in the 1840s, the Industrial Revolution became well established in the
United States. By the 1970s the mill building had fallen into disrepair. Some of them
were converted into housing. Others housed electronics firms. This helped revive Lowell.
Instead of a decaying old factory town there was a place that people wanted to live.2526
Factories are well suited for conversion to other uses. They have large open spaces, and
they are solidly constructed. The best thing about reuse is that it makes for interesting
places to live and work. In 1932 the Quaker Oats Company built large concrete grain
silos in Akron, Ohio. In 1980 conversion into a hotel began. The location helped make
the hotel economically viable. It also allowed Akron to keep a landmark which otherwise
might have been tom down.20
The same thing can be said for Philadelphia’s Reading Terminal. The last train
left the station in 1984. Since then it has been rebuilt into part o f the city’s new
convention center. Homage is paid to the history o f the building. On the floor of the old
train shed there are metal lines where the tracks were once located.27 The headhouse,
which formerly contained the railroad offices, was also restored, and now hosts the local

19 Diehl, 29
20 Walsh
21 Morrone, 209
22 Morrone, 15
23 Morrone, 125
24 Brand, 108-109
25 Marilyn Palmer and Peter Newman Industrial Archaeology (Routledge: 1998) 153
26 Brand, 105
27 National Railway Historical Preservation Society
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Hard Rock Cafe. The restored headhouse won an award from the local preservation
alliance.28
Sometimes it is easy to come up with a new use for a local landmark. For
example, the Bethlehem Steel complex in Pennsylvania produced steel that built some of
the most famous structures in the world. The H beams in the Chrysler Building and the
main gun turrets of the battleship USS Pennsylvania were made in Bethlehem.29 In 1998
the last part o f the steel plant closed. The Smithsonian Institute is supposed to use a part
o f the complex as a national museum o f industry. Another part is to become a museum of
steelmaking. This would allow the story of steelmaking in Bethlehem to be shown to
visitors o f the museum. However, the largest part o f the complex will be tom down.30 As
o f 2006, Bethlehem is still waiting for the museum to be built. If it does come about, it
will be a part of a larger development that will include a casino.31
Lima, Ohio, used to contain the Lima Locomotive works. They were famous for
the quality o f their locomotives. From 1882 to 1950 over 7,750 were built, including the
unique Shay logging engine. The locomotive factory eventually grew to contain twentysix acres of buildings.32 There was an effort to save the factories, restoring them to tell
the story of steam engine building at Lima. The effort eventually failed. Although there
had been local interest, a great deal of money is needed when preserving a large industrial
site. Because o f this, few industrial sites survive the end o f their working days.
Adaptive reuse o f buildings can be found everywhere. On Fairmount Avenue in
Philadelphia, there is an old firehouse that has become a restaurant. Even churches can
become something different. On Temple’s campus a small church built in 1890 is now
being used by the law school.33 Other campus buildings are also being used for purposes
other than for which they were built. The Bell Building, which houses the Campus
security office, was formerly owned by Bell Atlantic as their computer building. College
Hall, on Broad Street, was the original home o f Temple University. After recent
renovations, College Hall has become part o f Temple Law School. In February 1936,
Sullivan Hall was dedicated by President Franklin Roosevelt as the University Library.
Now, Sullivan Hall contains the Office of the University President, amongst other
things.34
Preserving old buildings is a form of recycling. If a building can be reused it saves
the disruption caused by the demolition. For example, there is no need to find a place to
dump the chunks of concrete, wood, and stone inevitably left after demolition. In fact,
reconstructing an old building can save money since the demolition costs are saved with a
rebuild. The difference can be between three to sixteen percent from the cost o f new
construction.35 Sadly, the prevailing trend is to tear down rather than rebuild.

28 R. M. Shoemaker Co. Reading Terminal Headhouse Wins Award. Accessed at:
http://ww.rmsco.com/RTH.htm
29 Andrew Garn, Bethlehem Steel (Princeton Architectural Press: 199) 15,34
30 Gam, 44
31 Save Our Steel, accessed at: http://ww.saveoursteel.org/MuseumdealSteeI.htm
32 Hans Houshowser, “Bringing ‘The Loco’ to Life in Lima” Locomotive and Railway Preservation (Issue
31: March/April 1991) 11
33 Temple University, accessed at: http://ww.tempIe.edu/maps/buildings/ParkHall.html
34 Temple University, accessed at: http://ww.temple.edu/maps/buildings/CollegeHall.html
35 Brand, 93
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Usually the demolition of a building is preceded by poor maintenance. There is no
fame or fortune to be had in maintaining a building, but it is necessary for its health and
longevity. Owners, faced with a desire to cut expenses, will usually aim the budget ax at
preventive maintenance first. As the cost o f the repairs needed to make up for poor
maintenance grows, new construction begins to look like a better idea than keeping the
older building active. Too, the tenants sometimes move out o f the poorly maintained
structure and abandon the building. In general, if the cost of fixing what is needed is more
than half the cost o f replacement then the building will be abandoned.36
Preservation sometimes can be difficult. In late 2001 the city government of
Detroit was planning to demolish Tiger Stadium, former home of the Detroit Tigers.
Opened in 1912, the same week the Titanic sank, generations of Tiger fans watched
games there. “We like sitting in the same seats our grandfathers used,” says Bob Buchta,
cofounder o f the Tiger Stadium Fan Club.37 The last season for Tiger Stadium was 1999.
As o f the 2006 World Series, Tiger stadium was still standing. Current plans call for the
playing field to remain as it is. However, the rest o f Tiger Stadium will be demolished.
Shopping and condominiums will surround the playing field. People will still be able to
see where Babe Ruth and Ty Cobb played, but in a vastly different context. The space
used by the fans o f the Tigers will be gone.38
The preservation movement saved the cities from even more destruction. The
centers of cities are now likened to antiques, with people wanting to come and see
them.3940 In the early 1960s old was worthless. Urban renewal was the way to save the
cities, even as it was actually destroying them. The preservation movement changed this.
Preservationists say that landmark buildings belong to the people, even if they are
privately owned. As a result it is no longer so easy for the owners or operators of a
building to tear down a well-loved old structure.
If people start thinking about preservation, they will be returning to a way of
thinking that has a long history. New College, Oxford, was founded in the 14th century.
The oldest building on campus dates from 1386. In 1865, the oaken roof beams were
found to be rotted. This caused some concern, because even in 1865 it was not easy to
find solid oak beams two feet square and forty-five feet long. However, the original
builders of the hall planned for this. They had planted a grove of oaks to provide wood to
replace the beams.41 Contrast this attitude about building maintenance with that shown in
the Sydney Opera House. A symbol of Australia, its unique roof shells can potentially
last for centuries. However, the joints between the roof shells were sealed with a material
with an expected life of twelve years. No means of inspection or replacement was
provided.42 Which way of thinking about a building makes more sense? As far as anyone
knows, no new oaks have been planted by New College to replace the roof beams around
the year 2345, the next time replacement beams may be needed.43
36 Brand, 112
37 Michael Gerschman, Diamonds (Houghton Mifflin: 1993) 232
38 Mel Antonen, “Once a Baseball Cathedral, tiger Stadium Now Sits in Disrepair” USA Today
(10/18/2006)
39 Brand, 102
40 Diehl, 19-20
41 Brand, 130
42 Brand,120
43 Brand,130
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It’s easy to be unrealistically nostalgic about preservation. Many places in
Philadelphia date back to the beginning o f the 20th century. Are they worth preserving?
Some of these areas have been described as looking “more like Dresden than a
preservation paradise.”44 Yet there are some places worth saving and reusing. A New
York Times editorial o f October 30, 1963 said “We will probably be judged not by the
monuments we build but by those we destroy.”45 Pennsylvania Station was tom down to
make way for the new Madison Square Garden. In 1984, Madison Square Garden itself
was threatened with demolition. Such instability cannot be good for a city. New
construction is not always the answer. In fact, in the end it can cause more problems than
it is supposed to solve.
Much of what feels wrong with modem life could be addressed by a sense of
community and a sense o f roots. The old neighborhood was a place where neighbors sat
on the front porch and talked to each other. Jobs were close by, and kids walked to
school. Modem society offers many advantages, but also some serious problems can
occur. Many Americans want the simple life o f a neighborhood, even as inner city areas
that could meet the need are being demolished. Outside the cities open spaces are being
turned into houses that separate rather than unite the people that live in them. People
who have roots know where they belong. It stands to reason that when many different
generations attend the same school the school is then better taken care of. When the local
residents can tell who used to live in the house across the street, they believe their
neighborhood belongs to them. Preserving old buildings can help make all this happen.
Is the preservation o f neighborhoods a guarantee against social ills? O f course it is
not. However, it is a direct contradiction to some of the social problems that have come
with the growth of suburbanization and sprawl. The preservation o f older bits of the built
environment is also a way for historians to contribute some solutions to the modem
world. Historians can, by studying what was, give meaning to what is and what will be.

44 Kin Keister, Ed. “Preservation News” Preservation (September/October 2001) 12
45 Diehl, 154
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Vietnam and Iraq
By Mike Nicholas ‘07

The entire body o f human history is replete with similar events which echo each
other through each generation. Yet in the present day no such parallel has been given
more attention, scrutiny and examination than that which is purported to exist between
the current war in Iraq and the Vietnam Conflict. Advocates arguing that such a
commonality exists between the two are quick to display various points of similarity,
complete with the familiar language of words and phrases such as quagmire, stalemate,
and exit strategy. Their advocacy is not entirely without merit, for there are striking
similarities between Iraq and Vietnam. Yet to label the two wars as parallel suggests
only a cursory understanding of the complexly interwoven web of issues that was
Vietnam and that has been Iraq. Despite some similarity, they are fundamentally and
practically different conflicts, and as such are inherently dissimilar.
At the heart o f the difference between the Iraq War and the Vietnam Conflict is
the type o f war being waged. Vietnam was, at its core, a war for national independence,
a people’s war characterized by a class based insurgency whose goal was to unite the
country against a perceived privileged elite and their occupying allies.1 This was evident
immediately after World War I when Ho Chi Minh traveled to Paris to press for
recognition of Vietnamese independence and a national, unified government. France
refused to assent, maintaining its colonial control over the southern portion of Vietnam
and continuing to tighten its grip over the whole of the country. Further, the Vietnamese
had a long history o f resisting invading forces dating back to the Qin Dynasty in China.
At the time of major American involvement in the conflict, Ho Chi Minh was able to
characterize the war not as a defense of communism or a defeat of the United States per
se, but rather as a war for Vietnamese independence and the dislodging of imperial
invaders and their allies. In this sense, the Vietnam War was being fought long before
major U.S. involvement in the 1960s, since Ho Chi Minh was able to begin the armed
struggle for independence immediately following World War II. Nationalism united

Biddle, Steven. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2006. Vol. 85. Iss. 2

The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1

24

Minh and his followers, as the desire for independence fueled their continued enthusiasm
for action.
Iraq, in contrast, has devolved not into a people’s war for independence, but a
communal war with competing factions advancing different ideologies and agendas. The
goal o f each of these separate factions has been that o f survival over the other, more so
than national unity against an outside aggressor. The insurgents in Iraq have offered
essentially two competing ideologies, one being a state of permanent jihad (as advocated
by Al-Quida), and the other being that the minority Sunni Arabs deserve and are entitled
to rule over the majority Shiites and Kurds.2 This is best illustrated by the vast majority
of insurgent violence (85%) in Iraq, which has been caused by indigenous Sunnis, and
further most insurgent actions have occurred in the four Sunni dominated provinces,
despite the fact that only 40% o f the population live in this area.3 In Vietnam the clear
and stated goal o f Ho Chi Minh and the insurgency was national unification, as such
outside occupation was considered ample cause for war. Yet in Iraq those provinces
dominated by Shiite and Kurdish majorities have experienced negligible incidents of
violence as a result o f U.S. occupation.4
The nature o f the insurgency against the United States in Iraq versus that faced in
Vietnam extends further than the motivation o f the enemy. The actual composition,
tactics and execution o f the war in Iraq has been markedly different than that o f Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese were known for their skill in fighting a guerilla war, avoiding
direct confrontation with the United States in favor o f evasive, precision strikes designed
to hurt U.S. forces without suffering major losses. These guerilla tactics manifested
themselves in the form o f ambushes, raids, and various other “small” operations. Despite
claims o f similarity, such guerilla tactics have been rare in Iraq since 2004. Insurgents
have recently operated in small groups o f three or four, and have targeted not the bulk of
U.S. troops but civilian population centers, Iraqi police forces and Iraqi troops.5
The very notion of guerilla warfare presupposes the use o f military or paramilitary
troops to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy using unconventional means. The enemy
in Iraq, unlike the enemy in Vietnam, has proven incapable o f accomplishing this task.
This is evidenced by the rate of U.S. troop loss as a result of suicide bomb attacks and
other confrontations. Instead of losing entire platoons, the U.S. has suffered casualties in
groups o f eight or nine at a time. Indeed it is considered a “significant loss” should more
than a dozen troops die in combat, however in Vietnam the enemy inflicted that many
number of casualties in a matter of minutes during any engagement.6
Underscoring the organization o f the enemy are the political institutions of both
countries. Where Vietnam contained a highly organized and established communist
government in the north and a quasi-democratic society in the South, Iraq was under
dictatorial rule until the end of major combat operations in 2003 when Saddam Hussein
was removed by U.S. ground forces. Unlike Vietnam, the entire political structure o f the
country was placed directly under the U.S.-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority.

2 Kagan, Frederick W. “Iraq is Not Vietnam.” Policy Review. Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006. Iss. 134.
3 Biddle, Steven. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2006. Vol. 85. Iss. 2
4 Biddle, Steven. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2006. Vol. 85. Iss. 2
5 Kagan, Frederick W. “Iraq is Not Vietnam.” Policy Review. Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006. Iss. 134.
6 Kagan, Frederick W. “Iraq is Not Vietnam.” Policy Review. Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006. Iss. 134.

The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1

25

The United States, despite exercising influence over the government o f Diem, was never
able to wield the entire political structure of Vietnam, and thus was never able to
implement its goals for the country as efficiently or with as much control over the
distribution o f resources as has been available in Iraq. This control allowed the U.S. to
transfer sovereignty to Iraq and allow democratic elections to occur in 2005, elections
which most Iraqis (particular Shi’a and Kurds) felt were legitimate.7 This is in stark
contrast to the U.S. efforts to promote democratic reforms in Vietnam; America was
never quite able to provide for a democratic government supported by a majority of the
South Vietnamese.
The final relevant point of difference between the types o f enemy faced during
each of the two conflicts is the international support surrounding each opponent. The
United States perceived Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese to have the support of
China and the Soviet Union, and this perception formed the basis of the domino theory
that would be used to justify American entry into Vietnam. Further, this support strongly
influenced U.S. policy in terms of conducting the war, both in strategic decisions as well
as international negotiations. Thus the enemy in Vietnam was not only the North
Vietnamese; it was also the Soviet Union as America’s competing superpower and China
as the dominant communist Asian power in direct proximity to Vietnam.8
Iraq has lacked this dynamic. The United States stands as the world’s sole
superpower, has been engaged in a coalition action (albeit with the U.S. playing the
vastly dominant role), and has faced an enemy that is almost entirely Iraqi (the notable
exceptions being some Saudis and Iranians). America has not had to fear the same Cold
War consequences when dealing with Iraqi insurgents as it had to consider when dealing
with the North Vietnamese. As a result, despite some similarities in the war’s conduct,
the nature of not only the enemy but of the historical context is considerably different.
Without the Cold War as a backdrop, the United States had considerably different goals
set for the outcome o f the Iraq War than when it sought a satisfactory resolution to the
Vietnam conflict.9
What the goals of the United States exactly are in entering the Iraq War has
remained in dispute between the Bush administration and its various detractors. What is
not in dispute at the present time however is the goal of the military forces currently
stationed in Iraq: to create an environment stable enough to allow Iraqis to build a
working government as well as civilian and military infrastructure sufficient for selfrule.10 Superficially this can be viewed as a similar situation to Vietnam, where the
United States’ purported goal was to provide the same security so that South Vietnam
could establish the same necessary infrastructure. Yet Vietnam played out differently
than Iraq has so far in that as it became painfully clear that the South Vietnamese would
not be able to successfully repel the North’s advances, or provide security for themselves,
General Westmoreland repeatedly requested additional troops. This escalation was
allowed due to the Cold War mindset that convinced the Johnson administration into

7 Kagan, Frederick W. “Iraq is Not Vietnam.” Policy Review. Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006. Iss. 134.
8 Kann, Peter R. “A Bad Analogy.” The Wall Street Journal. 8 Sep. 2005. Pg. A 18
9 Kann, Peter R. “A Bad Analogy.” The Wall Street Journal. 8 Sep. 2005. Pg. A18
10 Leibstone, Marvin. “Comparing America’s Vietnam and Iraq Episodes.” Military Technology. 2005.
Vol. 25. Iss. 12
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believing that the fall of South Vietnam would mean the fall of the Asian continent to the
specter o f communism.11
No such specter exists in the current situation in Iraq. While it remains to be seen
whether or not additional troop commitment is necessary or if the Iraqis will ever be fully
capable o f providing for their own security, the key difference between the two conflicts
is that there is no national or unified opponent to Iraqi self-governance. Rather, there are
factions advancing ideologies that at times conflict. Unlike Vietnam, there is no primary
aggressor force with enough strength to adequately challenge the United States, there are
only various pockets o f insurgency that inflict physical and psychological damage
through small and specific actions, not military engagements. This situation alone
represents a different dynamic in the execution of the Iraq conflict as opposed to that in
Vietnam. It is impossible to tell at this moment whether or not this different dynamic
will produce a different ending.
Running parallel to the comparison of the international context is the comparison
of the major differences in reason as to why each conflict was entered by the United
States. With Vietnam, the U.S. had sent military advisors to South Vietnam from the end
of World War II all the way to the early 60s, but failed to formally commit military forces
until an attack was made (presumably) against U.S. ships patrolling the Gulf o f Tonkin.
This action led to an eponymous resolution authorizing President Johnson to take all
necessary measures to protect U.S. interests in Vietnam. The Iraq War, by contrast, was
begun on the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that
such action was necessary in the war on terrorism.12 What is significant about each of
these justifications is not the validity (or lack thereof) but the doctrine behind each. The
Gulf o f Tonkin Resolution was purported to be a response to an attack, a “second strike”
as a result o f the first blow being delivered by the Vietnamese. The authorizing
resolution given to President Bush was known as pre-emptive warfare, entered into to
prevent future aggression, even though no such aggression had manifested as a result of
Iraq’s actions.13
In essence, this doctrinal difference is significant in terms of answering the
Vietnam-era question o f “why are we here?” While the answers sounds similar (to stop
communism / to stop terrorism) the basis for each answer is significantly different in that
an attack was believed to have been made against the United States while in Iraq the
United States made a preemptive strike.
Furthermore, the diversity of media outlets and coverage of the Iraq War has led
to greater debate and division in the opposition to the Iraq War than in the Vietnam War.
When Walter Cronkite declared the war lost after the Tet Offensive (despite the battle
having actually been won by the United States) the vast majority of both the media and
the psyche o f the nation went with him. In that era, the news was covered primarily by
the three major news outlets. In Iraq, cable news channels and a greater diversity of
opinion has led to a more diverse opinion about the war in Iraq.14 While there was near
unanimous opposition to the continued involvement of U.S. troops after 1970 in Vietnam,

11 Leibstone, Marvin. “Comparing America’s Vietnam and Iraq Episodes.” Military Technology. 2005.
Vol. 25. Iss. 12
12 Cohen, Richard. “Vietnam It Isn’t.” The Washington Post. 30 October 2003. Pg. A23
13 Cohen, Richard. “Vietnam It Isn’t.” The Washington Post. 30 October 2003. Pg. A23
14 Krauthammer, Charles. “This is Hardly Vietnam.” The Washington Post. 16 April 2004. Pg. A2I
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Iraq has yet to reach such critical mass, and the diversity in public opinion remains a key
difference between the two conflicts.
Despite the significant differences in the political, social and military landscape in
Iraq and Vietnam, the most striking and significant difference between the two conflicts
lies in the level o f U.S. troop commitment, and more importantly in U.S. casualties. As
of March 2006, the total troop commitment of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq
combined has reached approximately 150,000, which pales in comparison to the
approximately 530,000 U.S. service personnel that were in Vietnam at the height of U.S.
involvement. Even more striking is the number o f casualties incurred by the U.S. during
this three-plus year conflict. To date [April 2006], the U.S. has suffered roughly 2,200
casualties after three years, compared to over 46,000 deaths due to combat actions in
Vietnam over 10 years, not including over 10,000 additional deaths due to non-combat
causes.15
The significantly less amount of casualties in Iraq can be attributed to the
composition o f the U.S. service personnel. Here lies another key difference between Iraq
and Vietnam. In Vietnam, substantial portions of the armed services were comprised of
draftees, with some 50,000 per month being inducted and sent to Vietnam at the height of
the conflict. The forces occupying Iraq are constituted entirely by volunteers.16 This has
led to a better-trained and more professional fighting force capable o f adapting to the
demands of desert warfare more efficiently than their Vietnam counterparts.
Furthermore, President Bush made the decision to call up the reserves and send them to
Iraq, something that President Johnson refused to do in the case of Vietnam. The result
has maintained a constant flow of professional soldiers into the Iraq conflict, while
draftees comprised the majority o f new entrants into the Vietnam conflict.17
None of these illustrative differences serve to categorically deny that there are
some stark similarities between Iraq and Vietnam. Similar problems and difficulties have
been here presented, and it is true that the end goal of Iraq, like that o f Vietnam, is not
quite clear. Further, there is no evidence that the war in Iraq can be won quickly, easily,
or even “won” at all (dependant on definition). Yet despite these similarities, and despite
the same potential for quagmire and stalemate, it is in the reasons for entering the war,
the composition of the enemy and their tactics, the political landscape, the international
context, the media coverage and the casualty ratio that we find clear and distinct
differences between the two conflicts. Iraq may echo Vietnam, but it is its own problem,
its own war, and will ultimately contain its own solution. Despite some notion of parallel
between the two, Iraq and Vietnam are inherently dissimilar wars.

15 Sorley, Lewis. “NoMore Vietnams.” The American Enterprise. Mar. 2006. Vol. 17. Iss. 2.
16 Sorley, Lewis. “NoMore Vietnams.” The American Enterprise. Mar. 2006. Vol. 17. Iss. 2.
17 Sorley, Lewis. “NoMore Vietnams.” The American Enterprise. Mar. 2006. Vol. 17. Iss. 2.
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BookReviewI
Paul Revere's Ride

By David Hackett Fischer

Reviewed by Sarah Bischoff ‘08
Few college students have made it through their elementary and secondary
education without encountering the poem “Paul Revere’s Ride” by Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow. It is filled with imagery that sheds light on the heroism of one man who
dares to defy the British army. Riding alone in the moonlit night, Paul Revere single
handedly warns the citizens of towns surrounding Boston of the impending invasion.
Thus, the Americans are able to unite against the British redcoats to begin a war that will
eventually win them independence. While Longfellow’s poem makes for a very good
story, it is nevertheless very misleading. In Paul Revere's Ride, Professor of History
David Hackett Fischer o f Brandeis University uses a wealth of primary sources to
construct an accurate portrayal of an event that is often known to Americans simply as
Paul Revere’s Ride.
The book focuses specifically on the events of two days—the night the British
troops began their march to Lexington, and the following day when they were met by
organized groups of American militia. However, Fischer also provides a good
background to the events through his discussion o f major characters and occurrences that
preceded the night o f April 18,1775. One unique aspect of this historical account is the
nearly indiscriminate descriptions of characters on both sides of the conflict. Fischer uses
an adequate degree o f fairness in describing British figures such as Thomas Gage and
Lord Hugh Percy and does not cast a negative light on them merely because of their
efforts against American independence.
In his book Fischer explains the buildup of tension between the colonists and the
British government, one that occurred over the course of several years, and how that
tension culminated into the events that were made famous by Longfellow’s poem. Instead
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of the lone rider, Fischer promotes the idea o f a collective group o f colonists that all
played a part in forming an opposition to the redcoats. This collective group had steadily
gained strength, most significantly after the Boston Massacre of March 5,1770, and had
become a widespread network of colonists that were prepared to fight against the British
government.
Paul Revere’s role in this collective effort was not that of a solitary leader who
convinced Americans to rally behind him. His significance instead lies in the many and
various connections he held in different communities throughout the colonies. His work
as an artisan, his involvement in a variety o f different organizations, and his concept of a
gentleman as one whose status “could be attained by self-respecting men in any
occupation” all contributed to the array of friends and acquaintances he acquired.
Ultimately, Fischer argues that Revere’s unique character and personality allowed him to
associate with a variety of colonists in all professions and trades and thus brought
together many Revolutionary factions into one, united group.
Throughout Paul Revere’s Ride Fischer analyzes other significant figures o f the
Revolution, including Samuel Adams, Thomas Gage, William Dawes, John Adams, Dr.
Joseph Warren, and Margaret Gage. His physical and character descriptions are colorful
portrayals and draw the reader into the events o f the book. They also convey one clear
message: the stories of heroes—whom we admire for their ability to single handedly
change history through their own will—are often misleading interpretations of events.
In Paul Revere‘s Ride we discover that one man was not alone responsible for
touching off the American Revolution, as the poem would have you believe. Instead, an
integrated network o f various individuals came together to fight for one common goal.
We find that Longfellow’s captivating, enthralling poem is not exactly the depiction of
reality we had once thought it was. Perhaps we even feel a nostalgia for that old version
o f the same story. But then we realize that Fischer’s version creates its own heroic story.
Not that o f one man, but that o f a multitude of Americans who put aside their differences,
in occupation and social status, to fight together against oppression. We may even begin
to like Fischer’s version better.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Pp. 445. $19.95
Genre: American History
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BookReviewII
"Six D ays or Forever?"

by Ray Ginger

FOREVER?

TennesseevJohnThomasSoopes

Ray Ginger

Reviewed by Christopher Schwartz (Graduate Student)
We tend to forget that the “Roaring Twenties” wasn’t just coquettish flappers,
mighty art deco skyscrapers, joyful Jazz, and bootlegging gangsters as well as fear of
“The Rising Tide o f Color,” rapacious financiers pillaging the stock market, and anarchist
terrorist attacks. This era was “roaring” for many good reasons, and no one roared louder
than William Jennings Bryan, the “Great Commoner,” the man who became a legend of
Progressivism - and Christian fundamentalism.
Ray Ginger’s Six Days or Forever? chronicles Bryan’s last days, as he clashed
with agnostic Chicago lawyer Clarence Darrow in Scopes v. the State o f Tennessee in
what has been mythologized as the Scopes Monkey Trial. We remember this event as
one of the first and greatest battles between modem liberalism and conservatism.
However, Ginger deftly details how the Monkey Trial was in fact a rouse, and ultimately
a disappointment for all sides, particularly for Bryan and the fundamentalists who
“imagined that the trial could be held to a fixed [predestined] pattern, not realizing how
the ritual o f the law would scramble the ritual of the revival”.' This book, like Ginger’s
famous opus, The Bending Cross, a biography of Socialist leader Eugene Debs, is
important reading for any serious student of 20th Century American history.
The body of the book, published in 1958, is a blow-by-blow account of the eightday trial itself, in a style similar to Mark Perry’s Grant and Twain (right down to how
this is really the story o f Bryan and his partisans, with Darrow and Scopes usually only
along for the ride). Most Americans have read Lawrence and Lee’s 1955 drama Inherit
the Wind, and for most it is the definitive version o f the trial. However, Ginger’s work
gives us the behind-the-scenes look at what really happened and the deviations between
fact and fiction are surprising.

Ray Ginger, Six Days or Forever? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958) 219
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The more famous drama portrays the Scopes character, “Cates,” as unfairly
persecuted. However, Scopes was duped by a group o f local businessmen, led by
entrepreneur George W. Rappelyea, into getting himself arrested. The group hoped that
the publicity surrounding the ensuing trial would help to revive the town’s ailing
economy and status. At the neighborhood drugstore the “guileless young man, with blue,
contemplative eyes” was drawn into a conversation with the businessmen about whether
“the Bible was ‘mere history’” or should be taken literally. Two lawyers in the group
wanted to know the schoolteacher’s opinion. “[He] found himself observing that nobody
could teach biology without using the theory o f evolution. [...] Rappelyea said, ‘You
have been violating the law.’ ‘So has every other teacher,’ said Scopes,” who then
handed them the state-sanctioned textbook.2 Scopes would later remark, “It was just a
drugstore discussion that got past control,”3 and then after the trial confess innocence to a
reporter, “that he had missed several hours o f class, and the evolution had been one of
them!”4
This was the most startling revelation o f the book, but Ginger has another doozy:
it was the defense team, not the prosecution, which desired to make the trial about the
theory of evolution, so as to ultimately test the constitutionality o f the Butler Act in
federal court.
Darrow’s mapped route for the trial had reached dead end - in a legal and
educational dump. He had argued that the Butler Act violated freedom of
speech and religion. The judge had overruled him. He had planned to show that
the Act was too vague to be valid because the theory o f evolution and the Bible
both required interpretation. He had also planned to show that the Act was not a
reasonable exercise of the police power because the evidence o f evolution was
overpowering. The judge had blocked both those roads.5
“Unless we land in the Federal courts,” Darrow argued to his colleagues, “the whole
matter o f evolution, pro and con, may be ruled out in Dayton. In other words, the case
might resolve itself into the simple question o f whether .or not Scopes taught evolution in
his classes”6- which was precisely the plan o f the prosecution. Indeed, Scopes was only
accused of, and eventually found guilty for, violating the Butler Act by teaching his
young students a “theory that denies the story o f the Divine Creation o f man as taught in
the Bible ... instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals,”7 and not for
weighing in on one side or the other in the competing truth-claims of the Darwinists and
fundamentalists.
As commented before, this book has many similarities to Perry’s Grant and
Twain. It is essentially an account of the trial, with historical data and commentary about
the culture and society o f the time sprinkled along the way. The bulk of the analysis is
reserved for the very first and last chapters, but it is intense and insightful analysis.

2 IBID, 19
3 IB ID ,20
‘ IB ID ,119
5 IBID, 148
6 IBID, 83
7 IBID, 9

The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1

33

His first chapter is devoted to “Law as Symbolic Action,” and he makes a
frightening argument about American culture that would simultaneously intrigue and
distress political scientists, professors, and concerned citizens: Americans lack cognitive
coherence about most political issues, possessing a muddle and mix of positions on any
given subject. Moreover, they are pervasively apathetic (look at voter turnouts, which
rarely make it above 40% o f the eligible electorate), so that the beliefs they do express
are largely the result o f the leadership acting upon them. The result, thus, is minority rule
and not majority rule: those who lobby, filibuster, and politick are those who get their
way. The passage of the Butler Act is a superlative example of this, for as Ginger points
out, most Tennesseans never saw much controversy in evolution to begin with, but out of
a combination of confusion and guilt allowed the fundamentalists to press the issue. (In
fact, the Butler Act remained on the law books until 1967, when a dismissed
schoolteacher complained that it violated his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. Fearing another courtroom fiasco, the Tennessee legislature finally repealed the
law.)
Ginger also provided an in-depth look at the fault lines which existed - and I dare
say, persist to today - in the South and within the movement of fundamentalism: there
was and is no “Solid South,” not all traditionalists were or are actually traditional, much
less fundamentalist, and few fundamentalists in America actually wanted or want to do
away with science and technology, Luddite-style. He attributes the rise of
fundamentalism in the 1920s to anxiety arising from multiple sources.
During the 19th Century, Americans were still primarily agrarian or living in small
towns. “While dependent on the impersonalities of the market,” Ginger writes, “they
were not directly under the power of any other man who could be pointed out and called
by name. A man could, in satisfying ways, still call his soul his own”.8 Advanced
technology, corporate capitalism, immigration, slums, and organized crime changed all
that: “The erstwhile independent men joined up in the new industrial armies, the new
bureaucracies in which each man was subject to personal dictation o f his superior. The
farm boy came to the city, and he was often revolted and outraged by what he saw there.
And above all, he was frightened and tormented by his loneliness.”9 The atrocities and
scale o f the First World War increased “the sense of losing one’s birthright, of alienation,
of betrayal.. ,” 10 The doctrine of original sin added guilt to the festering stew o f negative
emotions: “the feeling o f having sinned [for being human], of being at the verge of
eternal damnation, was intolerable, and men had to assure themselves o f their basic
goodness,” an effort requiring a simple definition of morality, such as not drinking
(Prohibition)... and not being a radical. “The Red Hunt,” he writes, with its insistence
that radicalism was a foreign doctrine that no native-born American could adhere to,
culminated logically in the wave of brutal deportations”.11
This brings me to the final interesting element of the book: the author himself and
his own era, the 1950s. Raymond “Ray” Ginger (b. October 16th, 1924 - January 3rd,
1975) was an historian who sought to explicate the findings of his critical research, as
well as his interpretations of American history, through literary biography. His specialty

8 IBID, 8
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was Labor from the end of Reconstruction to the Great Depression. While working on
his Master's degree at the University o f Michigan, Ginger wrote The Bending Cross. He
then went on to earn his Ph.D. in American Culture at Case Western Reserve University
in 1951, subsequent to which he made the fateful decision o f accepting a post at Harvard
University.
In 1954, as the country trembled with the terrors o f McCarthyism, Ginger was
called upon by university officials, in the presence o f FBI agents, to sign an oath that he
was not a member o f the Communist Party. They demanded that his wife, the civil
liberties lawyer Ann Fagan Ginger, who was not connected with Harvard, sign a similar
oath. The university made an ultimatum: either sign or his contract would be broken. He
chose to resign.
Aggravated by Ginger’s chutzpah and fearful of bad publicity - and with it,
further scrutiny from McCarthyites - Harvard threatened to withhold the balance o f his
salary on his contract unless he left the state immediately. So, suddenly unemployed,
with one child and pregnant wife, Ginger and his family fled to New York, where they
encamped with relatives they had never met. There, his wife gave birth as a charity
patient. The next few years were terrible for the scholar as he struggled with alcoholism,
divorced, remarried twice, and was able to land temporary appointments at Brandeis
University and Wayne State University before finally getting a tenured position at the
University o f Calgary, in Alberta, Canada.
When Americans think of the 1950s, our minds tend to be subject to the same
kind of ideas as when we think of the 1920s. The cold, fanatical stare of Joe McCarthy
now seems as ridiculous as the fundamentalist posits of William Jennings Bryan. But
both had very real and demoralizing impacts on their times, and from them a very
interesting historical lesson can be observed and learned.
Oxford University Press, 1974.
Pp. 270. Price: Varies
Genre: 20th Century American History

